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Introduction
In recent years the information demand of financial markets has stimulated the creation of several new economic indicators. However, only a few of them have actually gained widespread attention. Stock and Watson (1999) examine 168 economic indicators to forecast inflation, but financial markets only react to a small fraction of them (see, e.g., Ederington and Lee (1993) , Fleming and Remolona (1999) and Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) ). The large number of economic indicators is therefore puzzling, especially since many of them provide information that is already available to the market. This paper analyzes the properties an economic indicator needs to gain market impact if a similar indicator already exists. We provide both theoretical and empirical evidence that timeliness and information quality are the two main determinants of an economic indicator to obtain market participants' attention, and thus, to gain market impact.
Proposing a sequential Bayesian learning model, we first analyze how the information provided by two similar economic indicators is processed at financial markets from a theoretical point of view. The model shows that the magnitude of the market reaction to the release of an economic indicator depends primarily on two factors. First, its market impact is directly related to the quality of the released information, in particular, to the extent to which this information allows to obtain more precise estimates of the underlying information subject. Second, the market impact of an economic indicator is stronger the earlier it is released, i.e., the earlier market participants can update their expectations of economic conditions. This disadvantage of a late release results primarily from the fact that market participants have more precise prior expectations due to similar information they already have obtained from earlier released economic indicators. Overall, the model suggests that an economic indicator that is released more timely and provides more or equally precise information should have a stronger market impact than an otherwise comparable indicator.
A unique opportunity to test the model implications empirically provides the analysis of the two largest German business surveys, i.e. the IFO business climate indicator and the ZEW economic indicator: First, both indicators contain similar information. They are based on surveys among market participants about their expectation regarding economic conditions within the next six months. 1 Thus, they have a similar information content, i.e. both provide information about future economic conditions, but might differ in terms of information quality. Second, the indicators were introduced to the market one after another. The IFO business climate index published by the Institute for Economic Research was introduced for West Germany in 1969 whereas the ZEW economic indicator, published by the Centre for European Economic Research, was introduced in 1991. Both indicators are published monthly but the ZEW indicator is released one to two weeks before the IFO indicator. This structural break in information flows offers an opportunity to test the implications of our model empirically: Before 1991 market participants could only use survey information provided by IFO to update their expectations regarding real economic conditions. With the release of the ZEW indicator in 1991, a second information source emerged that allows an earlier update of economic expectations as compared to the IFO indicator.
We take this structural break as a natural experiment to test the influence of timeliness and information quality on the market impact of two similar economic indicators.
In the first step, we investigate whether the information quality of both indicators is indeed comparable. As a benchmark to measure their information quality, we follow Huefner and Schroeder (2002) and relate both indicators to the growth rate of industrial production.
We evaluate the information quality of the indicators in terms of predictability of industrial production and conduct out-of-sample forecasts obtained from different forecasting models.
We find that both indicators have a similar information quality, i.e. both indicators are useful to forecast industrial production. A difference in market impact should therefore be driven by timeliness.
In the second step, we investigate the market impact of both indicators. According to our sequential Bayesian learning model the ZEW indicator should have a stronger market impact since it is released earlier than the IFO indicator. Analyzing the price impact of both economic indicators on the German bund futures market supports the model's predictions. We observe a significant price reaction to the release of both indicators within the first release minute. However, the price reaction is significantly stronger for the ZEW indicator than for the IFO indicator. To gain further insight if the difference in timeliness accounts for this result, we investigate how the price impact of the IFO indicator changes after the ZEW indicator was introduced to the market. If timeliness is the reason for the different market impact, the introduction of the ZEW indicator should lead to a decreasing price impact of the IFO indicator. Indeed, we find that the price impact of IFO was stronger before the ZEW indicator was introduced to the market and decreased significantly after the introduction of ZEW. 2 Overall, the empirical results strongly support the implications of our sequential Bayesian learning model: timeliness and information quality are the main determinants of an economic indicator's market impact. In particular, the relative price impact of the two largest German business surveys shows that even a large and well-established economic indicator like the IFO indicator can loose part of its impact, if a similar indicator is introduced to the market and released earlier. These results provide important implications for statistical agencies. If a new economic indicator is developed, these agencies face the problem of a trade-off between information quality and release time: a higher information quality requires more (precise) information to be included in the indicator while an early release time usually forces the agency to issue less precise information. We show that it is harder to achieve a superior information quality than to simply choose an early release time.
Thus, it might be easier to follow a publication strategy that ensures that the indicator is released as timely as possible from a statistical agency's point of view.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the dynamics of information processing at financial markets (see, e.g., Ederington and Lee (1993) , Fleming and Remolona (1999) , and Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005) ) by investigating the determinants of the relative price impact of two similar economic indicators theoretically and empirically. We also contribute to the literature testing the implications of Bayesian learning (see, e.g., Krueger and Fortson (2003) and ) and provide empirical evidence that Bayesian updating best describes information processing at the German bund futures market. Overall, the results allow for a better understanding how fundamental economic information is incorporated into asset prices.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we derive the determinants of an economic indicator's market impact from a sequential Bayesian learning model. Section 3 provides a description of our data and the model implementation. The impact of a timely release on the market impact of the two German business surveys is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Determinants of Market Impact -Conclusions from a Sequential Bayesian Learning Model
We first derive the determinants of the relative attention market participants pay to two similar economic indicators. Typically, data on market participants' attention are not available. However, from a Bayesian learning perspective market participants' attention is directly related to the shift in their mean expectations after some information is released.
This shift in expectations is reflected by the strength of price adjustments at financial markets. Thus, a reasonable proxy variable for the attention that market participants pay to the release of an economic indicator is the market impact of this indicator. We propose a Bayesian updating framework to analyze how two sequentially released economic indicators with similar information content affect asset prices at financial markets. In particular, we investigate what determines the relative strength of the price impact of these indicators.
In financial markets research a wide variety of Bayesian learning models has been applied (see, e.g., Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) , Kim and Verrecchia (1991) , Blume, Easley, and O'Hara (1994) , Veronesi (2000)). In the following we extend the Bayesian learning model of for the case of sequential information arrival. In line with standard Bayesian learning models our sequential model produces two fundamental results: first, the price reaction is driven by the amount of unanticipated information.
Second, the precision of the released information acts as a catalyst in determining the strength of this price reaction. Moreover, our sequential model allows us to analyze the relative strength of the price reactions to two successively announced economic indicators.
Assume that two announcements regarding some economic variable X (e.g., some survey estimates of the 'true' economic conditions) are made at time t = 1 and t = 2. Furthermore, assume that market participants form homogeneous and normally distributed expectations with respect to X before the outcome of the first announcement at t = 1. Let µ F 1 denote the mean expectation and ρ F 1 its precision (i.e., the inverse of the variance). 3
At time t = 1 the first announcement, A 1 , is made, i.e., a noisy estimate of X (e.g., derived from a survey among experts) with an additive, zero mean normally and distributed error ε A1 that is independent of X. Let µ A1 = X + A1 denote this announced estimate and ρ A1 the corresponding precision. 4
After this first release market participants update their expectations regarding X, with mean posterior belief µ P 1 (i.e. the updated belief)
and precision ρ P 1 of this posterior
It is important to note that the announcement influences both market participants' mean beliefs and the precision of their beliefs,
as long as the announcement is not perceived to be completely uninformative (or noisy), i.e.
as long as ρ A1 > 0. In particular, the implication for the precision of market participants expectations is important. Even if the information in the announcement is completely anticipated (i.e. if there is no surprise at all, µ A1 − µ F 1 = 0), the announcement would nevertheless change market participants expectations by enhancing the precision of their beliefs (i.e., ρ P 1 > ρ F 1 ) given that the released information is not completely noisy.
Now, prior to the second announcement at t = 2, market participants again form expectations about its outcome. Correspondingly, let µ F 2 and ρ F 2 denote the mean expectation and the precision as well as µ A2 and ρ A2 the announced second estimate and its precision.
We assume that this second announcement provides another noisy estimate of X, i.e., µ A2 = X + ε A2 where ε A2 is another mean zero normally distributed disturbance that is independent of both X and ε A1 .
Again, after this second release market participants update their expectations. Correspondingly to the updating after the first announcement, we get
and
Note that we abstract from information asymmetries and assume that all market participants receive the announced information at the same time. In addition, we suppose that the precision parameters of the model are all known. 5
For simplicity assume now that no other (relevant) information arrives besides the two announcements. In this case, the prior beliefs regarding the outcome of the second announcement are equal to the posterior beliefs after the first release, i.e. µ F 2 = µ P 1 with ρ F 2 = ρ P 1 , and we may rewrite (5) as
Furthermore, under the standard assumption of a linear relation between asset prices P and traders expectations with respect to X, e.g., 6
after the second announcement one obtains a linear relation between the price changes and changes in market participants expectations, i.e.,
with S t = µ A1 − µ F 1 and π t = ρ A1 /ρ P 1 for t = 1 and S t = µ A2 − µ F 2 and π t = ρ A2 /ρ P 2 for t = 2. From the preceding analysis it can be seen that (under the standard assumptions) the usual results of Bayesian learning models hold, (1) price changes are proportional to the unanticipated information component in an announcement, i.e., the surprise S t at time t, and (2) the strength of this price reaction is determined by the relative precisions of the released data and posterior beliefs (i.e., the aggregated precision of forecasts and data). In addition, this analysis yields a first answer to our initial question, i.e., whether the strength of the price reaction to the sequentially made announcements differs. From Equations (3), (7), and (8) it follows that
after the second announcement
To obtain a straightforward interpretation of this result consider the special case that both economic indicators are equally informative, i.e., ρ A1 = ρ A2 , and that they both release exactly the same (although independent) estimate µ A1 = µ A2 = µ F 1 . This case can arise if two competing agencies publish an economic indicator with a comparable information content (but derived from independently taken surveys). In this case
Overall, from the above analysis it follows that the price impact of the second announcement is lower due to two effects: Firstly, the surprise component of the second announcement is smaller, i.e.,
since market participants have adjusted their mean expectations after the first announcement. Secondly, the relative precision of the second announcement is lower, i.e.,
since market participants' beliefs have become more precise due to the information provided by the first announcement. 7 7 Consider a simple numerical example: Let µ F 1 = 100 while µ A1 = µ A2 = 115 and ρ F 1 = 0.1 in contrast to ρA1 = ρA2 = 0.2. Moreover, assume ν = 1. Given these figures we would observe a price change of 10 from 100 (= µ F 1 ) to 110 (= µ P 1 = µ F 2 ) as a reaction to the release of the first economic indicator, but only a price change of 2 after the release of the second economic indicator. However, also the If the releasing agency aims to attract more attention, or equivalently, increase the market impact of the second economic indicator, it could try to enhance the information precision.
However, in order to obtain the same market impact (per unit of surprising information) as the first announcement, i.e.,
the precision of the second announcement would need to be increased by the factor (1 + ρ A1 /ρ F 1 ). This may be hard to achieve in practice. 8
This suggests a clear-cut "first mover advantage": the first release receives more attention because it has a stronger impact on market participants' expectations: Therefore it has a stronger price impact, given a similar content and precision of the released information.
The disadvantage of the second economic indicator results primarily from the fact that it is confronted with more precise prior expectations. It is rather difficult to compensate for this disadvantage by increasing the precision of the second economic indicator. 9
For the subsequent empirical analysis, the model yields the following testable implications:
H1: Relative price impact in a static framework
Consider the case of two existing economic indicators with a comparable information content. Then, the influence of the later announced indicator should be smaller the more valuable information is provided by the first indicator.
Given approximately equal precisions of two sequentially announced indicators with surprise components in the announcement are different although both release the same figure (115). While the surprise component in the first announcement is 15, the surprising information reduces to 5 for the second announcement since traders have already adjusted their expectations. In addition, the surprising information component in the second announcement receives a lower weight (i.e., π 2 = 2/5 in contrast to π 1 = 2/3), since the precision of market participants expectations increases after the first economic indicator is released (from ρF 1 = 0.1 to ρF 2 = ρP 1 = 0.3) due to the additional information provided by this economic indicator. 8 In the previously given numerical example the precision of the second announcement c.p. would need to be tripled (from 0.2 to 0.6) in order to obtain the same market impact as the first announcement. a comparable information content, we should observe that the strength of the price impact of the later announced indicator is significantly lower.
H2: Relative price impact in a dynamic framework
Consider the case that at some point in time a new economic indicator is introduced which has a comparable information content as an already existing indicator and assume that this newly introduced indicator is released earlier than the previously existing indicator.
In this case we would expect a significant decrease in market participants' attention to the 'older' indicator and thus a significant decrease in its price impact, primarily due to the fact that the older indicator is confronted with more precise prior expectations.
H3: Change of analyst forecast dispersion
The introduction of a second (and earlier released) indicator should also affect market participants prior expectations before the release of the older indicator. If the new indicator provides valuable information (i.e., ρ A1 > 0), its introduction should increase the precision of market participants' prior beliefs with respect to the later announcement (i.e., ρ F 2 ).
Hence, after the introduction of the new indicator, the precision of observable analysts' forecasts (as a proxy for market participants prior expectations) for the later announced indicator should be higher as compared to the period before.
3 Data and Implementation of the Model
Information Components of the ZEW and IFO Indicator
Our analysis is based on the two largest German business surveys, i.e. the ZEW and IFO indicators, that were introduced to the market one after another. Both indicators have a similar information content, i.e. they capture market participants expectations with respect to future economic conditions. The ZEW economic indicator is a monthly survey conducted among 350 financial analysts Overall, the two indicators used in our analysis seem to be very similar with respect to their information content. To further illustrate the properties of both indicators, we calculate summary statistics in Table 1 .
-Please insert TABLE 1 approximately here -
The minimum and maximum values indicate that the ZEW indicator has a stronger variation as compared to the IFO indicator. Since the IFO indicator is calculated with respect to the base year 2000, its standard deviation is lower as compared to the ZEW indicator.
The large differences in the means and standard deviations of the indicators point out the need to rescale both indicators in order to make them comparable for further analysis.
Our sample begins in 1991 and ends in 2005. All numbers used in our study are as initially announced at the day of the news release, i.e. we use unrevised time series of all indicators.
Rescaling of Indicators to achieve Comparability
Since the ZEW indicator is a balanced indicator, we also use the balanced values of the IFO indicator to achieve comparability. We transform the index values of IFO to balanced values based on the following equation provided by the IFO institute: 
Transforming IFO data according to (9) guarantees that surprise components in both indicators are measured on the same scale. Summary statistics for the surprise components used in our analysis are given in Table 2 .
-Please insert 
Benchmark to measure Information Quality of both Indicators
In order to measure the information quality of the ZEW and the IFO indicator we need to define a benchmark, i.e. a forecast target against which we can benchmark the information provided by the indicators. Survey based economic indicators are often interpreted as leading indicators or proxies for changes in real economic activity. Bram and Ludvigson (1998) find that improvements in US consumer sentiment are positively related to an increase in the consumption growth rate. This finding is also supported for European data by Nahuis (2000). Golinello and Parigi (2003) find that consumer confidence across various countries is useful to forecast GDP. Huefner and Schroeder (2002) find that the ZEW and IFO indicators are useful to predict the year-over-year growth rate of German industrial production. Therefore, we follow Huefner and Schroeder (2002) and benchmark both indicators against the growth rate of industrial production. 14 13 Nevertheless, we calculate surprises with index values of the IFO indicator and standardize surprises by the standard deviation of the corresponding announcement. Results (not reported) remain similar. All results not reported in this paper can be obtained from the authors upon request.
14 Alternatively, the gross domestic product (GDP) could be used as a benchmark. However, GDP information is provided only on a quarterly basis while industrial production is released monthly, i.e. with the same frequency as our economic indicators.
14 The year-over-year growth rate of German industrial production is published with a delay of two months within the monthly reports of the German Centralbank, i.e. the figure for January is published in March. We hand-collected two time series out of these reports to get the initially announced (unrevised) figures for West-Germany and for the whole country (labeled as Pan-Germany). In addition to data for Pan-Germany, we use data for West-Germany because the IFO indicator was published for West-Germany up to 2004.
Thus, the correct reference series for this indicator would be the industrial production of West-Germany during this time. 15 Thus, the indicators seem to contain similar information. However, the IFO indicator contains two components, the current economic situation as well as expectations about future economic conditions. In contrast, ZEW is exclusively based on expectations about future economic conditions and has no component on current conditions. To ensure a fair comparison of both indicators, we include the subindicator "IFO-expectations" in our further analysis. To investigate how the indicators are correlated with their reference series of industrial production, we calculate the cross-correlations for six lags of both indicators with the year-over-year growth rate of industrial production Pan and West Germany in Table 3 . more contemporaneously with industrial production, whereas ZEW is correlated on higher lead-levels. Since IFO also contains information about the current economic situation, this finding is not very surprising. We therefore compare the cross-correlations between the subindex "IFO expectations" and industrial production to correlation between the ZEW indicator and industrial production. Here we can also see that ZEW is still leading industrial production on the sixth lag whereas the IFO expectations series has its highest correlation at the third (IP West) to the fourth (IP Pan) lag.
To investigate the leading properties of both indicators with respect to industrial production, granger causality tests are conducted as well. The results (given in the Appendix) are in line with earlier findings of Huefner and Schroeder (2002) who also report that both indicators improve forecasts of industrial production with the ZEW indicator being significant on higher lead orders. 17 However, even if the ZEW indicator has a higher leading order over industrial production, this does not necessarily mean that it contains more information. A more meaningful criterion is the out-of-sample forecast quality of both indicators which will be conducted in the following section.
Evaluation of Information Quality
One reason for the existence of only a few model tests of Bayesian updating is the problem to measure information precision indicated by the parameter ρ in our model. We argue that the information disclosed by the ZEW and IFO indicator is equally precise. To investigate if this is indeed the case, we assume that the indicators' information quality is determined by their usefulness in forecasting future economic conditions. Hence, we analyze their forecast performance conducting rolling window estimations of different time series models to forecast industrial production with and without including the indicators' information. 18 We use a rolling window of eight years. 19 The basic equation used to forecast industrial production reads:
We estimate different AR(MA) models varying from AR(1) up to AR (12) and T rend defined as the normalized elapsed time within our estimation window). Furthermore, we estimate the models with and without accounting for GARCH effects and seasonal volatility effects.
We then re-estimate every model specification and successively include the IFOexpectations series or the ZEW indicator from 1 up to 8 lags. Overall, we estimate 540 different equations. In the next step, we conduct out-of-sample forecasts for every model and evaluate the forecasting quality based on the root mean squared forecast error (RMSFE).
Results are given in Table 5 .
-Please insert The question whether this publication advantage leads to a stronger market impact of the ZEW indicator is investigated in the following section.
Empirical Results: Determinants of the relative Market Impact
To analyze the market impact of both indicators, we use high frequency data of one of the most actively traded government bond markets, i.e. the German bund futures market. We calculate log returns (multiplied by 10,000) for 1 minute intervals within an event window starting 30 minutes before the release of an indicator and ending 60 minutes after the release.
According to the efficient market hypothesis, market reactions to macroeconomic announcements should only be observable if the announcement contains unanticipated news.
To separate the effect of unanticipated news on bund future prices from the already expected part of the announcement, we calculate the difference of the released economic indicator and its expected value proxied by MMS analysts' forecasts as described in (10).
Analyst coverage of IFO begins in 1996, whereas the ZEW indicator is covered since 2001.
It seems reasonable to assume that the emergence of analysts' forecasts is a sign for an increased awareness of market participants to these indicators. Therefore, we restrict our sample for IFO to the period 1996-2005 and for ZEW to the period 2001-2005.
We employ the following equation to estimate how bund future prices react to unanticipated news of both indicators, we estimate the following equation:
On announcement day t we relate the price change, ∆P τ,t , within one minute intervals in our event window from τ = −30... + 60 to the surprise component of announcement i, S i,t , multiplied by a dummy variable D m with m = 1...5 for the first five minute intervals after the release. To account for differences in market volatility after the release of both indicators we also estimate the following Garch(1,1) model:
The mean equation contains dummy variables for the first five minutes after the release (m = 1...5), interacted with the surprise component of the announcement, S i,t · D m .
The variance equation is first estimated without dummy variables (model 1) and then reestimated with dummy variables (model 2) to allow for differences in volatility in the first five minutes, D 1−5 , in contrast to the following five minutes, D 6−10 and the next five minutes, D 11−15 , after the release. Results are reported in Table 6 : We analyze the market reaction to the release of the indicators from the beginning of 2001 where the first analyst report for the ZEW indicator was issued. Splitting our sample in equally large subperiods of 1.5 years enables us to investigate changes in the market impact of IFO before and after ZEW was also covered by analysts. Since the previous results suggest that the price reaction is completed within the first minute after the release of an indicator, we now use returns within the first minute after the release and estimate the following equation:
We relate the price change, ∆P 1,t , within the first minute interval, D 1 after the release of an indicator i on day t to a constant and the surprise component of the release, S i,t multiplied by dummy variables D y indicating the subperiods y the announcement is attributed to.
Again, we estimate this model with (Panel A) and without (Panel B) accounting for GARCH effects. 21 Results are given in Table 7 .
-Please insert To investigate whether market participants' prior information indeed becomes more precise after the introduction of the ZEW indicator (see Hypothesis 3), we compare the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts with respect to the IFO indicator before and after the ZEW indicator was introduced to the market. 25 Results are given in Table 8 .
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The standard deviation of analyst forecasts with respect to the IFO indicator decreases after the introduction of the ZEW indicator. If the data is split after the release of the first 22 Since there is no similar information available when the ZEW indicator is released, market participants have less precise priors and surprises should thus be larger. 23 We do not find a significant price reaction for the first 1.5 years in which IFO was covered by analysts. We argue that there have to be enough market participants reacting to the release of the indicator. This point is obviously first reached in 1998 where the market reacts significantly negative to the release of IFO. We observe a similar pattern after the first analyst report of ZEW, where the market reaction also became stronger after 1.5 years.
24 An increasing impact of the ZEW indicator is to some extent surprising, if all market participants became aware of this information source at the same time. It indicates that it takes market participants some time to fully understand the ZEW indicator.
25 Individual analyst forecasts for the ZEW indicator and the IFO indicator are obtained from Bloomberg.
analyst forecast of the ZEW indicator (Model 1), the standard deviation decreases about -0.06. However, the difference is not statistically significant. This is due to an increased volatility of forecasts within the first six months after both indicators exist at the market. If this time period is excluded from the sample, the standard deviation significantly decreases about -0.09. Generally, our results support Hypothesis 3 showing that the precision of market participants' expectations regarding the IFO indicator increases after the ZEW indicator has been introduced to the market.
Taken together, our findings are in line with the implications obtained from the Bayesian learning model showing that a timely release is an important determinant of the market impact of an economic indicator.
Conclusion and Implications
Both our theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants of investor attention to new information reveal a clear result: the timeliness of an information release is an important factor to explain the strength of its price impact. According to a sequential Bayesian learning model, information quality as well as the rank in the release sequence are important. The disadvantage of a late release could in principle be compensated by a higher precision of the released information. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that a later released report provides more precise information since additional time and effort could be put into the preparation and validation of the released information or that more (i.e., late) survey respondents could be included. Nevertheless, the model also implies that only a substantial -not just an incremental -increase in precision can compensate for being late. In addition, our empirical analysis suggests that such a substantial increase is hard to achieve in practice.
Our empirical analysis focusses on the intraday price reaction at the German bund futures market to the release of two similar but sequentially introduced German economic indicators, namely the ZEW and IFO indicator. Both indicators contain similarly precise information regarding future economic conditions but the monthly release of IFO occurs after the release of ZEW. First of all, we find that bund futures prices significantly react to the unexpected news component of both indicators. As predicted by our model, the price impact of the IFO indicator significantly changes by the time the ZEW indicator receives full market attention for the first time (i.e., when analysts start to provide forecasts).
Providing at least the same information quality but being published around one to two weeks in advance, the ZEW indicator gains a significantly stronger market impact than the IFO index. Moreover, comparing the market impact of the IFO index over time we find a significant decrease coinciding with the time the ZEW indicator begins to receive market attention.
In addition, our Bayesian learning model implies that the ZEW information leads to an increase of the precision of market participants' expectations regarding the later released IFO information. In fact, we find that the dispersion of analysts' IFO forecasts decreases substantially after the introduction of the ZEW indicator.
Overall, our empirical findings strongly support the model implications, i.e., both timeliness and information quality of an indicator are important determinants of how much attention market participants pay. Nevertheless, timeliness seems to be more important,
i.e. the disadvantage of coming late is hard to outweigh by providing more precise information. This has important implications for statistical agencies developing an economic indicator. When designing an economic indicator, it is important not only to ensure a high information quality provided by the indicator, but also to distinguish this indicator from other, already existing indicators, that might provide similar information from an investors' point of view. Most importantly, an early release time increases the attention the market pays to the indicator and is therefore crucial to gain market impact.
Appendix
Granger causality tests between the economic indicators and industrial production are conducted based on the following regression equation: 26
We relate the year-over-year growth rate of industrial production, IP t , to the optimal number of autoregressive lags, j IP t−j in addition to different lag numbers of one of the two indicators, X t−i . This allows us to investigate, if the inclusion of a given indicator provides additional explanatory power for the regression. 27 Estimation results are given in the following table:
Granger causality among IFO/ZEW and Industrial Production Panel 1 ZEW granger-causes Industrial Production PAN zew-lags intercept AR (1) AR (2) AR ( On announcement day t we relate the return within one minute intervals in our event window from τ = −30... + 60 to the surprise of announcement i, Si,t, multiplied by a dummy variable Dm with m = 1...5 for the first five minutes after the release. Column 1 contains results for the ZEW indicator. Column 2 contains results for the IFO indicator and Column 3 contains results for both indicators, respectively.
Panel B contains results for the following GARCH(1,1) model: ∆P τ,t = c + β · ∆P τ −1,t + m δ m S i,t · D m + τ,t , τ,t = µ τ,t σ τ,t andσ 2 τ,t = ω + α 2 τ −1 + γ j D j . We estimate the mean equation for i = ZEW orIF O, relating the returns of the German bund futures market, R τ,t within the τ -time intervals in our event window, to its first order lag, ∆Pτ−1,t and the surprise of the announcement,Si,t multiplied by dummy variables for the first five minutes after the release, Dmwithm = 1..5. The variance equation always contains the squared lagged error, 2 τ −1,t and dummy variables for the five minute intervals after the release, Dj. Column 1 contains results for the ZEW indicator. Column 2 contains results for the IFO indicator and Column 3 contains results for both indicators, respectively. Robust standard errors are estimated with heteroskedasiticy consistent covariance (Bollerslev-Wooldridge). Significance levels are indicated as follows: * * * 1% significance, * * 5% significance and * 10% significance. Panel A of this table contains regression results of the following equation ∆P1,t = α + y βy · Si,t · Dy + t. We relate the return within the first minute interval after the release of an indicator, ∆Pt on day t to a constant and the surprise component of announcement i on day t, Si,t multiplied by dummy variables Dy indicating the years of our subperiods. As subperiods we use equally large intervals of 1.5 years, beginning in June 1996 where the first analyst forecast for IFO was released.
Panel B contains results for the following GARCH(1,1) model: ∆Pτ,t = c + β · ∆Pτ−1,t + m δmSi,t · Dy + τ,t, τ,t = µτ,tστ,t andσ 2 τ,t = ω + α 2 τ −1 + γyDy. The mean equation relates the return of the German Bund Futures market, ∆Pτ,t, within the τ -time intervals of our event window to its first order lag, ∆P τ −1,t and the surprise of announcement i,S i,t with i = ZEW, IF O multiplied by dummy variables D y for each subperiod of 1.5 years. The variance equation always contains the squared lagged error, 2 τ −1,t . and dummy variables for the volatility in the first minute after the release within our subperiods of 1.5 years, D y . Robust standard errors are estimated with heteroskedasiticy consistent covariance (Bollerslev-Wooldridge). Significance levels are indicated as follows: * * * 1% significance, * * 5% significance and * 10% significance. (Column 1), while the data in Model 2 does not contain the first six months after the introduction of the ZEW indicator (Column 2). The difference is calculated based on a two-sided t-test. Significance levels are indicated as follows: * * * 1% significance, * * 5% significance and * 10% significance.
